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Abstract 
Recently, a mutual semi-quantum key agreement protocol using Bell states is 
proposed by Yan et al. (Mod. Phys. Lett. A, 34, 1950294, 2019). The proposed protocol 
tries to help a quantum participant share a key with a classical participant who just has 
limited quantum capacities. Yan et al. claimed that both the participants have the same 
influence on the final shared key. However, this study points out that the classical 
participant can manipulate the final shared key by himself/herself without being 
detected. To solve this problem, an improved method is proposed here. 
Keywords Semi-quantum. Quantum key agreement. Permutation attack. Substitution 
attack. 
1. Introduction 
Quantum key agreement (QKA) protocol [1] is proposed for helping the involved 
participants share a fair secret key. Here, ‘fair’ means none of the proper subsets of the 
involved participants can determine any part of the final shared key without being 
detected by the others. In 2004, Zhou et al. [1] proposed a QKA protocol first. 
Afterword, several QKA protocols [2-7] have been proposed. However, most of these 
QKA protocols need all the involved participants to have lots of quantum capabilities. 
To help the participants who just have restricted quantum capacities can be involved in 
the QKA, the semi-quantum key agreement (SQKA) protocol [8, 9] is proposed.  
    Recently, Yan et al. [10] proposed a two-party SQKA protocol using Bell states. 
They claimed that, in their SQKA protocol, both participants have equal contribution 
to the final shared key. However, this study shows that an involved participant can use 
two different attack strategies to choose a preferred key as the final shared key without 
being detected. Hence, to avoid these attacks, a simple modification is proposed here. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, Yan et al.’s SQKA 
protocol is reviewed. In Section 3, we show the attacks on Yan et al.’s SQKA protocol 
and then propose a modified method to avoid them. At last, a conclusion is given in 
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Section 4. 
2. A brief review of Yan et al.’s SQKA 
Before reviewing Yan et al.’s SQKA protocol [10], some background is introduced first 
here. 
2.1 Background 
In Yan et al.’s SQKA, four single photons { 0  , 1  ,    
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2.2 Yan et al.’s SQKA protocol 
Suppose that there are two participants Alice and Bob involved in Yan et al.’s SQKA 
protocol. Alice is a quantum participant who has unrestricted quantum capacities and 
Bob is a classical participant who is restricted to perform the following four operations. 
(a) Generate qubits in Z-basis  0 , 1 . 
(b) Measure qubits with Z-basis. 
(c) Reorder the qubits via different delay lines. 
(d) Send or reflect the qubits. 
Then Yan et al.’s SQKA protocol can be described as follows. 
Step 1: Alice generates 2n  Bell states       1 1 2 2 2 2, , , , , ,A B A B A n B nB q q q q q q  
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where each Bell state is in either   or   randomly. Then she divides 
B   into two ordered particle sequences  1 2 2= , , ,A A A A nS q q q   and 
 1 2 2= , , ,B B B B nS q q q . Subsequently, she sends BS  to Bob. 
Step 2: Bob generates a random bit sequence  1 2= , , ,B B B BnK k k k . Then, for each 
qubit received, Bob randomly chooses one of the two following cases. 
Case (a). Bob does not perform any operations on this particle. 
Case (b). Bob measures this particle with Z-basis and generates a particle 
whose value is the XOR of the measurement result and Bik
 1 i n   where i  is the i th measured particle. That is, assume 
that the measurement result is   0,1i ir r  , then Bob generates a 
new particle in the state i Bir k . For example, if the measurement 
result is 1  and =1Bik , then the generated qubit will be 0 .  
Finally, Bob performs a permutation operation on all the 2n  particles via 
different delay lines and then sends them back to Alice. 
Step 3. After Alice receives the returning qubits, she generates a random 2n -bit 
sequence rAK   { 1 2 2, , ,A A A nk k k } as her secret raw key for further quantum 
key agreement. Subsequently, she announces rAK . Then Bob announces the 
positions of all the particles in Case (a) and the corresponding permutation 
operation on them. 
Step 4. Alice uses the published information to check whether there is an eavesdropper 
during the qubits transmitted processes or not. That is, for each particle in Case 
(a), Alice performs Bell measurement on this particle and its corresponding 
qubit in AS . Then she checks whether the measurement result is equal to the 
initial state or not. If the error rate exceeds a predetermined value, this protocol 
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will be aborted. Otherwise, Bob discards the corresponding bits in rAK  to 
obtain Alice’s secret key AK . 
Step 5. Bob announces the permutation operation performed on the remaining qubits. 
Alice recovers these qubits to a correct order according to this information and 
then uses Bell measurement to obtain BK . For instance, assume that the initial 
state of  ,Ai Biq q  is 
  (  ). If the measurement result of  ,Ai Biq q  
is   or   (   or   ), Alice can know 0Bik  . Otherwise, 
Alice can know 1Bik  . 
Step 6.  Alice and Bob obtain the final shared key =AB A BK K K . 
3. The loopholes in Yan et al.’s SQKA protocol and an 
improvement  
Yan et al. claimed that neither Alice nor Bob can manipulate the final shared key ABK  
without being detected. However, this section points out that Bob can use a permutation 
attack or a substitution attack to choose a preferred final key ABK   instead. Besides, a 
simple solution is hence proposed. 
3.1 Permutation attack on Yan et al.’s SQKA protocol 
At the end of Step 4, Bob can obtain Alice’s secret key AK  and then computes the 
final shared secret key =AB A BK K K . If he does not want to use ABK  as the final 
shared secret key, then he can announce a fake permutation operation in Step 5 instead. 
Upon receiving the fake permutation operation, Alice uses a corresponding fake inverse 
permutation operation to reorder the remaining qubits and then performs the Bell 
measurement to obtain a fake Bob’s secret key BK  . At last, she gets a fake final key 
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=AB A BK K K   which is chosen by Bob.   
    For example, assume that 1001AK   , 0101BK   and there are four particles 
{ 1 2 3 4, , ,B B B Bq q q q  } performed in Case (b) in Step 2. Moreover, assume that the 
measurement results of { 1 2 3 4, , ,B B B Bq q q q } are {
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}, respectively. 
And the initial states of {        1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4, , , , , , ,A B A B A B A Bq q q q q q q q  } are {
1 1,A Bq q
  , 
2 2,A Bq q
  , 
3 3,A Bq q
  , 
4 4,A Bq q
  }, respectively. Under these assumptions, the 
permutation attack on Yan et al.’s SQKA protocol can be described as follows.  
In Step 2, Bob uses Z-basis to measure { 1 2 3 4, , ,B B B Bq q q q }. Then, he obtains the 
measurement results {
1
1
r
, 
2
0
r
, 
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, 
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} and the qubits { 1 2 3 4, , ,A A A Aq q q q } held 
by Alice collapse into {
1
1
Aq
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0
Aq
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3
1
Aq
, 
4
0
Aq
}. Subsequently, Bob generates the 
particles { 1 1 1= 1 0 1B Bq r k     , 2 1Bq  , 3 0Bq  , 4 0Bq  } and performs 
a permutation operation on them. Finally, he sends these particles back to Alice. At the 
end of Step 4, Bob obtains the final shared key = =1100AB A BK K K . If Bob wants to 
choose another key =1010ABK   instead, in Step 5, he can announce a fake permutation 
operation with which Alice will recover the  1 2 3 4, , ,B B B Bq q q q     into 
 1 3 2 4, , ,B B B Bq q q q     . Then, Alice performs the Bell measurement on {  1 1, ,A Bq q
 2 3, ,A Bq q  3 2, ,A Bq q  4 4,A Bq q  } and obtains the measurement results {
1 1,A Bq q


  , 
2 3,A Bq q


 , 
3 2,A Bq q


 , 
4 4,A Bq q


 }. According to these measurement results and the 
initial states, Alice gets 0011BK    and then obtains a fake final key 
= 1010AB A BK K K    which is manipulated by Bob. 
3.2 Substitution attack on Yan et al.’s SQKA protocol 
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In Step 5, if the measurement result obtained by Alice is the same as the initial state, 
she will think 0Bik  . Hence, in Step 2, Bob can perform Case (a) on the particles 
where 0Bik   instead. Then, after Bob obtains 
r
AK   in Step 3, he can announce 
arbitrary parts of the particles in Case (a) for eavesdropper detection and the remaining 
particles will be a substitution for key bits where 0Bik  . This method can help Bob 
choose a preferred final shared key without being detected. 
    For example, assume that, 01000001rAK   and there are eight particles in Step 
2. If Bob performs Case (a) on the particle where 0Bik  , we can assume that the case 
sequence {a, a, a, b, a, a, b, a} is performed on the eight particles. Here, the case 
sequence can be converted to a key bit sequence rBK ={0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0}=00010010. 
After Bob gets rAK  , he computes =
r r r
AB A BK K K  =01010011. If Bob wants to use 
‘0000’ as the final shared key, he can announce the positions {2, 4, 7, 8} for the 
eavesdropper detection. Then, after Alice and Bob discard the bits on the positions {2, 
4, 7, 8} of rABK =01010011, the final shared key will be =0000ABK . Similarly, if Bob 
wants to use ‘1111’ to be the shared key, he can announce the positions {1, 3, 5, 6}. 
3.3 A solution to the loopholes  
In the permutation attack, because the fake permutation operation cannot be detected 
by Alice, Bob can manipulate the final shared key. If the fake permutation operation 
can be detected, this problem will be solved. That is, if Bob does not perform any 
operations on the qubits in Case (b) where 0Bik  , without the correct permutation 
operation, the Bell measurement performed by Alice on the particles will result in an 
entanglement swapping [11]. Then the measurement results of the particles where 
0Bik    cannot always be equal to the initial states. Hence, Alice can detect the 
permutation attack.  
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    In the substitution attack, because Bob obtains rAK   before announcing the 
positions for eavesdropper detection, he can exchange parts of key positions with the 
detection positions to manipulate the final shared key. Hence, if Bob announces the 
positions before obtaining rAK , this attack can be solved. 
According to the above two methods, the detail of the improvement is as follows. 
Step 1* is the same as Step 1 in Section 2. 
Step 2*. Bob generates a random bit sequence  1 2= , , ,B B B BnK k k k . Then for each 
qubit received, Bob randomly chooses one of the two following cases. 
Case (a). Bob does not perform any operations on this particle. 
Case (b). For the i th  1 i n   particle in Case (b), if =0Bik , Bob does not 
perform any operations on this particle. Otherwise, Bob measures 
this particle with Z-basis and generates a flipped particle. That is, 
assume that the measurement result is 0  ( 1  ), then Bob 
generates a new particle in 1  ( 0 ).  
Finally, Bob performs a permutation operation on all the 2n  particles via 
different delay lines and then sends them back to Alice. 
Step 3*. After Alice receives the returning qubits, Bob announces the positions of all 
the particles in Case (a) and the corresponding permutation operation on them. 
Step 4*. Similarly, Alice uses the published information to check whether there is an 
eavesdropper during the qubits transmitted processes or not. If she makes sure 
that there is not an eavesdropper, she generates a random n -bit sequence AK
  { 1 2, , ,A A Ank k k } as her secret key and announces AK . 
Step 5*. Bob announces the permutation operation performed on the remaining qubits. 
Alice recovers these qubits to a correct order according to this information and 
then she uses Bell measurement to obtain BK . For instance, assume that the 
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initial state of  ,Ai Biq q  is 
  (   ). If the measurement result of 
 ,Ai Biq q  is 
 (  ), Alice can know 0Bik  . If the measurement result 
is    or   (   or   ), Alice gets 1Bik   . Moreover, if the 
measurement result is  (  ), this means there is eavesdropping on it or 
Bob announced a fake permutation operation. 
Step 6* is the same as Step 6 in Section 2. 
With this modified method, the problem can be avoided. 
4. Conclusions 
Yan et al. proposed a mutual quantum key agreement protocol using Bell states. 
However, this study points out that Yan et al.’s SQKA protocol suffers from a 
permutation attack and a substitution attack. To avoid these attacks, a solution is 
proposed here.  
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